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ANOMALOUS MONISM: OSCILLATING BETWEEN DOGMAS
ABSTRACT. Davidson’s anomalous monism, his argument for the identity between men-
tal and physical event tokens, has been frequently attacked, usually demanding a higher
degree of physicalist commitment. My objection runs in the opposite direction: the iden-
tities inferred by Davidson from mental causation, the nomological character of causality
and the anomaly of the mental are philosophically problematic and, more dramatically,
incompatible with his famous argument against the third dogma of empiricism, the separa-
tion of content from conceptual scheme. Given the anomaly of the mental and the absence
of psychophysical laws, there are no conceptual resources to relate mental and physical
predicates. We fall in the third dogma if we claim that the very same token event is mental
and physical. One of the premises must be rejected: I will claim that we do not need a law
to subsume cause and effect to be entitled to speak of causation. Davidson has never offered
an argument to back this premise. Against such a dogma I will sketch some ideas pointing
towards a different conception of causality, singularist and undetachable from explanatory
practices.
1.
The aim of this paper is to expose an inconsistency within Davidson’s phi-
losophy and to argue that his commitment to the nomological character of
causality is dogmatic. Davidson famously argues for an identity between
tokens of mental events and tokens of physical events. This identity allows
him to hold that mental events can have causal powers despite there not
being psychological laws nor psychophysical laws and causality being
nomological. The absence of psychophysical laws, consequence of the
different principles that constitute the physical and psychological schemes,
makes it impossible to resort to identities between mental and physical
types. The absence of psychological laws implies that behind explanatory
links between mental events there must, in principle, be descriptions of
those very events amenable for subsumption under physical laws. This
argument has not ceased to attract critical attention. However, the crit-
icisms almost unanimously centre on the insufficient degree of monism
granted by the argument, and demand a deeper commitment to physi-
calism (an excellent recent example can be found in Michael Antony’s
‘Davidson’s Argument for Monism’ 2003). My objection comes from
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the opposite flank. I will claim that within a Davidsonian conception we
lack the conceptual resources to establish the token-identities that do the
trick. Davidson’s influential argument against any separation of concep-
tual schemes from pre-conceptualised contents (empirical or otherwise)
makes it inconsistent to expect that events individuated physically and
events individuated psychologically may happen to be the same. Someone
unconvinced by Davidson’s rejection of what he calls the third dogma of
empiricism may ignore this charge.1 To the question “if different descrip-
tions of the same event can be given, which is the event that can be so
described?” she may answer, with Elisabeth Anscombe, “pick up the de-
scription that you like the best!” This option is not open to Davidson: not
only there is no guarantee that we do pick up the same event with different
descriptions; if the descriptions are conceptually unrelated, the event must
be noumenal2 (on pain of reintroducing the scheme/content dualism). Not
all is lost, though. Mental causation, the anomalousness of the mental and
its irreducibility to the physical may be preserved by rejecting the idea that
causality must be nomological. An alternative to this Humean prejudice
will be sketched at the end of this essay.
2.
The problem of mental causation is central for modern philosophy. It is
the point of encounter between the alleged inevitability and closure of the
causal and the phenomenologically felt freedom of action. Donald David-
son’s philosophy is perhaps the most brilliant and explicit contemporary
example of this tension. Two of his theories stand out from his work and
highlight the tension: radical interpretation and anomalous monism. The
first establishes that something meaningful cannot be understood in iso-
lation from other meaningful things, but rather globally: when we make
sense of someone’s speech or rationalize her behaviour we need to as-
sume a shared world which is inconceivable independently of a shared
intentional net. Davidson dedicates to this idea one of his most subtle ar-
guments: his rejection of the third dogma of empiricism, the separation of
conceptual scheme and empirical content. But, on the other hand, the thesis
of anomalous monism claims that every mental event is identical to one
physical event even though the former are characterized anomically and
holistically while the latter can, in principle, be individuated atomistically
and are subject to laws. So, Davidson’s way to reconcile both poles of
the tension is to concede them both. Nevertheless, I will argue, there is
an internal inconsistency between both arguments and, hence, we need to
look somewhere else to ease the tension.
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A mental event can be the cause of another mental events, or of a
physical event, or can be caused by a physical event, inasmuch as it is
also a physical event, i.e., in virtue of being potentially describable in
physical terms.3 For Davidson, event monism (i.e., the identity of mental
and physical events) is the way to make three principles compatible (see
Davidson 1970):
(1) Mental events cause physical events (Principle of Psychophysical
Interaction);
(2) When there is causation there is a strict law that relates cause and effect
(Nomological Character of Causality); and
(3) There are neither psychological nor psychophysical strict laws4
(Anomalism of the Mental).
This is the strategy that I will follow through the rest of this paper: first
I will motivate a general problem for identity theories by means of an
example; then I will summarize a diagnosis of the source of this problem
due by Jennifer Hornsby. After doing this I will look in some detail at the
specific difficulty that Davidson’s proposal has, and I will finish with a first
approximation to a conception of causality that does not define it in terms
of laws.
3.
Consider the following scenario: I have a conversation with someone who
just saw The Big Sleep. He is impressed with the film, and especially with
Bogart’s character, Marlowe. I tell him that the novel on which the film is
based is also very good, that Raymond Chandler wrote it and that he wrote
six more novels, all with the same main character. My interlocutor acquires
a new belief: “Raymond Chandler wrote seven novels”. This acquisition is
a typical Davidsonian token-event (let us call it m1).5 So, according to
Davidson’s argument for token-identity, there must be a token physical
event with which this acquisition is identical (say, p1). However, here is
where the intuitive problem starts. Our new Marlowe fan has acquired,
together with the belief above mentioned, an indefinite set of standing
beliefs, amongst which we can list “Chandler wrote more than one novel”,
or “Sam Spade is not the main character of any of Chandler’s novels”. Let
us call these acquisitions m2 and m3. These beliefs are clearly not identical
with the one explicitly acquired, but their acquisition, m2 and m3, must be
identical with some physical event. One likely candidate is p1, the event
with which we have identified m1. If m1, m2 and m3 were identical to p1,
then they would be identical themselves. So far, this is not a problem. The
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same token can instantiate several types simultaneously. In the situation at
hand p1 is a physical event token identical to a mental event token that we
have called m1, and m2, and m3, given that the mental token instantiates an
indefinite number of types including the three explicitly mentioned. Nev-
ertheless, how could p1’s causal powers account for the explanatory force
of the mental type m1, but not necessarily of m2 or m3, now considered as
mental types which p1 also instantiates?
Imagine now that my friend decides tomorrow: “I am going to buy all
the novels written by Chandler”. The tokening of this decision is also the
tokening of “I am going to buy seven novels”, and of “I am going to buy
more than one novel”, etc. As I said, a counterintuitive, but not contradic-
tory, consequence of this is that, even though the types are different, the
tokens are identical, given that they are identical with the same physical
event. But a bitterer pill has to be swallowed. Imagine now that my friend
makes the mistake of thinking that novelists only write novels, and not
short stories or cinema scripts. His decision, tomorrow, would also be, for
him, a tokening of “I am going to buy everything written by Chandler”.
And if that token is identical with the same physical event with which the
token “I am going to buy all the novels written by Chandler” is identical,
and hence identical with this last token, how is it that one decision will be
satisfied with seven novels and the other with seven novels, lots of short
stories, some scripts and poems, and a big surprise? Our rationalization
of his behaviour will have to choose amongst a variety of co-instantiated
mental events (types), but this choice cannot be made in terms of the phys-
ical description of the token that instantiates them. Physical descriptions of
causal relations bear no relevance to the mental connections, but it seems
that they should, as mental predicates cannot appear, according to David-
son, in laws. Given that the same mental/physical token instantiates an
indefinite number of types of belief-acquisitions, how could the physical
description of the token discriminate the fact that one of those acquisitions
is explicit while the others are implicit?
Davidson’s answer is that it cannot and it does not need to. His claim is
that the identity conditions for events in general are sameness of causes and
effects, regardless of the radically different vocabularies that may be used
to pick up such events. A complete physical description of the universe
would not suffice to predict a mental event, so described (it would, of
course, predict that very event under a physical description, but we may
well be forever incapable of knowing that both descriptions are descrip-
tions of the same event; see Davidson 1970, pp. 204–205). Hence, the
commitment to the existence of a potential physical description of any
mental event cannot play the role demanded by the concluding question
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of the previous paragraph: those descriptions will not help us, say, to
choose amongst competing rationalizations of an action. Then, what role
do the token-identities play? For Davidson, token-identities without corre-
sponding type-identities allow for a principled separation between causal
relations and causal explanations. Davidson needs to accept that the iden-
tity conditions for all events, mental or physical, are the same to make
his event monism possible. And, he needs to claim that these identity
conditions are independent of the preferred vocabulary to describe the
events and to account for their causal connections. Davidson understands
causal relations extensionally, as relations between events and not between
descriptions of events, while the opposite is true of causal explanations
(and of laws and nomological explanations). This allows him to claim
that there can be statements that truly capture a causal relation even if
such statements are not the upshot of a strict law: it is sufficient for such
statements to capture the right events, even if they do not do so under a de-
scription suitable for nomological explanation. One of the most important
insights behind this distinction is that giving an incomplete description of
an event-cause is not the same as giving a description of an incomplete
cause.
The central argument of this paper implies that Davidson is not en-
titled to such a severe separation between explanation and causation, on
pains of allowing causal relations to be free-floating, independent of our
conceptual resources and, ultimately, noumenal. The seed of this difficulty
can already be found in the very paper in which Davidson argues both
for the distinction of explanation and causation and for the need for an
ontology of events: he finishes his paper by claiming that events are needed
to make sense of our common talk and that our common talk is the only
way we have to show what there is (Davidson 1967, p. 162). This is a
quick way to state the impossibility of a scheme/content dualism, and it
leaves one wondering what resources our common talk (or, for that matter,
our scientific talk) has to allow us such a brusque separation between our
explanatory practices and the existence of extensional (causal) relations.
It may well be that causal explanations are opaque and causal relations
transparent, but the transparency of the latter cannot be used as a blank
cheque because, according to the criticism of the third dogma (that will be
explored in Section 5), which entities get related to which other entities
cannot be postulated independently of the conceptual framework needed
to make sense of such relations. But, famously, that framework excludes
laws connecting mental and physical predicates. With respect to sameness
of causes and effects as an identity condition for events, my objection holds
in the same way that it does for the radical separation of causal relations
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and causal explanations mentioned above. If Davidson is right in his rejec-
tion of the dualism, we would need ways to link intentional predicates and
physical ones, otherwise our belief that an event intentionally described
and an event physically described may share causes and effects must be
held on faith. If nothing that we could know would be sufficient to say
that two descriptions, one physical, one mental, are of the same event (as
Davidson admits at the end of ‘Mental Events’), then we could never jus-
tifiably claim that the two descriptions did in fact refer to the same event.
The only alternative would be to maintain that the connection between the
two events was something “given” from outside the conceptual realm.
But, if I am right in claiming that Davidson’s token-identities lie out-
side our conceptual resources and, hence, no atomistic identity conditions
can be given for the mental (given Davidson’s thesis of the holism of the
mental) then the only way to identify mental events would be to do so
in terms of the intentional vocabulary that defines talk of propositional
attitudes, beliefs, desires, intentions and other mental states. Given that
the existence of an intentional description of an event is the criterion to
consider it mental, mental events, and actions in particular, are placed in
the same holistic and normative net occupied by mental states. Davidson’s
attempt at rescuing mental events from the holism of the propositional
attitudes demands that sense can be made of their identity in causal, and
ultimately nomological, terms. But, I will argue, the possibility of such an
identity violates the rejection of the third dogma.
4.
In a series of influential papers, Jennifer Hornsby has criticized the
contention of weak physicalism (i.e., of token-identity theories such as
Davidson’s or Fodor’s) that we can have identities between events de-
scribed in an action or perception vocabulary and events described in a
physical vocabulary. Some actions,6 such as someone’s moving an arm,
seem describable in crudely physiological terms, such as someone’s con-
tracting her muscles. That is, as we can refer to someone’s kicking a ball as
someone’s scoring a goal, we can also say that an action is both the event
of someone’s contracting certain muscles and the event of her moving her
arm. If an action is an event that causes, amongst other things, muscle
contractions, the physicalist should, in principle, be able to identify it with
neurophysiological events.
But the crucial question is at what stage in the neural chain do we find
a person’s action? Where is the action itself, as distinct from its effects, as
distinct from the events the agent brought about? To think that an answer
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can be given is to assume that a sharp distinction between the events that
compose an action and those which result from it can be established. “If
scientists of the brain develop their classification of events independently
of our interests in recounting people’s actions, then why should we pre-
sume that what they single out is the same as what we single out when
we speak of actions?” (Hornsby 1980/81, p. 78). The contention here is
not just, as Hornsby says (ibid., n. 5, p. 91), that there is no reason to
think that what is captured by an action predicate can also be captured by a
neurophysiological (or, in general, physical) one. This is understating the
criticism. The idea is that what a token of an action predicate captures is
very unlikely to be univocally identified with one particular (token) de-
scription in physical terms. Hornsby, in a recent paper, uses a distinction
between the personal and the impersonal point of view (which she cor-
rectly refuses to equate with the subjective and the objective respectively)
to make the same point. From the first point of view, an action is a person’s
doing a certain thing for a reason, while from the impersonal, it would
be a link in a causal chain which is independent of reference to persons
or reasons. An action cannot be captured from the impersonal point of
view, because we “lack any argument for subsuming actions in the imper-
sonal world of causes” (Hornsby 1995, p. 174). The character of action
explanation appeals to a different standard of intelligibility than that of the
impersonal view, a standard that understands a person’s doing something
“by seeing her as (at least approximately) rational – as conforming (more
or less) to norms of consistency and coherence in her thought and practice”
(ibid., p. 172). This is, in fact, what Davidson has taught us.
Even if the reductionist (or the non-reductionist identity theorist) is
confident about finding a particular neurophysiological event that starts the
chain of causation, which starts the action, such confidence is difficult to
maintain in reference to the separation between the action and its effects.
She may say that the action started here (pointing at a certain physical
event), but she may not say where the action finishes. This is not an em-
pirical question, but one about how our common sense and our language
work, i.e., a philosophical question. And, if we agree that our common
sense and our language function on the presumption of normativity, then
nomological accounts will not deal with actions. Our conception of the
world independent of us, our impersonal view, is not a conception of the
world including us.
A different answer would hold that there are no actions (or perceiv-
ings, or feelings of pain). The problem is that this answer seems not to
be motivated by anything but the disappointment at not finding identities
(neither type nor token-identities) between them and physical events. This
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eliminativist answer is the last resort of a physicalism that can be neither
strong nor weak. Then it becomes absolute. But, unless we give pride of
place to the physical individuation of events, there seems to be little reason
to assert that mental and physical events are the same, i.e., to expect that
intentional descriptions of events and neurophysiological descriptions of
events could in principle meet (or that reference to mental events should
be eliminated, in the case of absolute physicalism). This picture, which
sees the neurophysiologist and the “everyday psychologist” as starting
from two radically different grounds, while at the same time hoping to
be working on the same material, reminds one of the joke about the two
Welsh miners who went to talk to the Prime Minister about their project
for the Channel Tunnel. They explained: “I will start digging in Dover and
my brother will start in Calais. We will meet half-way and that will be
it”. The Prime Minister asked: “What happens if you miss each other?”
“Then, you’ll have two tunnels for the price of one”. Having two tunnels
sounds like a good thing, but having two explanations that never meet is
a different matter. And we have no justification to expect them to meet,
unless there is a common plan. “Dig away and time will tell” is wishful
thinking. Separating science from our commonsensical world-view leads
to two tunnels that are not just unlikely to meet, but are also unlikely to
reach the shore. After all, almost as dangerous as thinking of reality as
made up of two different, incommunicated or mysteriously communicated,
worlds is to think that for something to be real it must be physical, in the
sense of being fully describable in terms of the physical sciences.
5.
So far I have only intended to shed doubts on the feasibility of establishing
anything short of a fully holistic identity between the mental and the phys-
ical and to sustain those doubts on Hornsby’s ideas about action and her
opposition to parcelling out identity in terms of events. Now I will give an
explicit argument against Davidson’s attempt at opening the door for other
kinds of identities. Clearly, token-identity is intended as an ontological
thesis. So, I will consider now whether Davidson can hold ontological
theses which are detached from explanatory practices. But his problem
is even tougher, because his rejection of the third dogma of empiricism
does not allow him to separate entities from our ways of conceptualising
them. How can the causal and the significative features of the same event
be captured by the nomological net of physics and by the rational net of
interpretation? Is the event given independently of these nets?
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The structure of my argument against Davidson’s entitlement to token-
identity is:
(a) For Davidson there are not strict psychological laws,
(b) There are not strict psychophysical laws,
(c) From (a) and (b) it follows that a mental type cannot be identified with
a physical type. However,
(d) No separation is possible between content and scheme, i.e., there are
no schemeless events waiting to be captured by one or more descriptive
frameworks. Something’s being a token of a type is not prior to there
being a type that captures it. A token can instantiate more than one type
only if the types can, in principle, be connected by a law. But there
are no psychophysical laws, given the anomalousness of Davidson’s
monism (b). Hence,
(e) A mental (or physical) event token can only be individuated with
respect to the mental (or physical) type that it exemplifies. In order
to defend event monism we need a schemeless method to individu-
ate events (given (c)), i.e., a method which allows us to say that the
same event is both the one described by the nomological vocabulary
of physics and by the normative vocabulary of psychology. But (d)
goes against such a possibility.
Davidson holds (a), which amounts to the thesis that the psychological
realm is not causally closed, as a consequence of two ideas: (I) ascrip-
tion of mentality is holistic, given that it involves the principle of charity,
i.e., the presumption of rationality, and (II) something’s being a mental
event constitutively depends on its place within a rational network (in-
dividual beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes are, according
to Davidson, dependent on our interpretative practices, not free-standing)
and it makes no sense to talk about rational networks independently of
interpretation. The mental is holistic and normative: mental events must be
individuated by their place in the general economy of propositional attitude
attribution, not in terms of atomistic causal links to other events. Of course,
this is not Davidson’s official story about the individuation of events. As I
pointed out in Section 3, Davidson needs to maintain that all events have
the same identity conditions to make his anomalous monism conceptu-
ally possible. His criterion is that “(. . . ) events are identical if and only if
they have exactly the same causes and effects” (Davidson 1969, p. 179).
However, the rest of this section tries to show that Davidson’s rejection of
the third dogma of empiricism, together with his insistence on the anomic
character of the mental, do not entitle him to such a criterion for event
identity. Furthermore, the central characteristic of anything mental, be it a
state or an event, is its place within an intentional, holistic, framework: “On
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the proposed test of the mental, the distinguishing feature of the mental is
(. . . ) that it exhibits what Brentano called intentionality. Thus intentional
actions are clearly included in the realm of the mental along with thoughts,
hopes and regrets (or the events tied to these)” (Davidson 1970, p. 211).
In contrast, physical events or, as Davidson would prefer to express it,
physical descriptions of events, are subsumable by laws. There are no strict
psychological laws to reduce to physical ones7 and, given the radically
different constitutive principles of the mental and the physical (normative
vs. nomological, i.e., prescriptive vs. descriptive), there cannot be bridge
laws between both realms: these are the reasons why Davidson holds thesis
(b). The conjunction of (a) and (b) is premise (3) of Davidson’s argument
for anomalous monism. Proposition (c) is a different way of stating (3).
I recognize that my phrasing of (d) as a consequence of Davidson’s
rejection of the dualism of scheme and content is controversial. I am going
to justify it. Davidson puts forward his argument against what he calls the
third dogma of empiricism as a radicalisation of Quine’s rejection of the
first two dogmas, the analytic/synthetic distinction, and the possibility of
reducing all meaningful statements to experiential statements. Davidson
follows Quine in refusing to accept a distinction between statements that
are true in virtue of their meaning and statements which are true in virtue
of the world, and goes one step further when he argues that we cannot
make such a distinction for our world-view as a whole. We cannot parcel
out the world’s contribution and our own contribution to the meaning of
beliefs and statements. The three dogmas are semantic theses, and so are
their rejections.
But, as Davidson’s work on radical interpretation makes it clear, seman-
tics and epistemology are not independent enterprises: meaning and belief
go hand in hand; it is a precondition to have thought to be a linguistic
creature whose speech is interpretable. Ultimately, this interdependence
of belief and meaning arises from the interdependence of two aspects of
interpretation, the attribution of beliefs and the interpretation of sentences
(see Davidson 1974, p. 195). His argument against the third dogma is thus
an epistemological argument: there is nothing given in experience which
can serve as a ground for knowledge.8 However, it is not just against the
experiential given or content that Davidson’s criticism is directed. The
dualism under criticism is the dualism “of organizing system and some-
thing waiting to be organized (. . . )” (ibid., p. 189). The supposedly given
entities waiting to be organized do not need to be experiences: “As for
the entities that get organized, or which the scheme must fit (. . . ) we
may detect two main ideas: either it is reality (the universe, the world,
nature), or it is experience (the passing show, surface irritations, sensory
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promptings, sense-data, the given)” (ibid., pp. 191–192). The rejection of
the third dogma is the rejection of a separation between concepts and em-
pirical contents, and a rejection of the separation of reality from concepts.
Semantics leads to epistemology and epistemology leads to metaphysics.
The opening paragraph of ‘The Method of Truth in Metaphysics’ (1977)
makes the connection between the three explicit:
In sharing a language, in whatever sense this is required for communication, we share a
picture of the world that must, in its large features, be true. If follows that in making mani-
fest the large features of our language, we make manifest the large features of reality. One
way of pursuing metaphysics is therefore to study the general structure of our language.
(Davidson 1977, p. 199)
If we can communicate, we must share knowledge. That is, a true picture of
reality. That is, a world. From where does Davidson get his token-identities
then? What area of our picture of reality can simultaneously capture nomo-
logical and anomalous characteristics of the same event? Davidson cannot
take an asymmetric stance with respect to “interpretative” and “scientific”
objects. But, it can be argued, Davidson retains an aspect of Quine’s sci-
entism to which he is not entitled after his rejection of the scheme-content
dualism. Once he admits that ontological matters cannot be established
independently of knowledge, it seems unjustified to claim that only the
objects and events picked up by the rational vocabulary are subject to the
model that connects them. Mental events are holistic, but this alone does
not make them more dependent on the framework where they belong than
physical events and objects are with respect to the model that relates them.
Davidson is not entitled to a stronger form of realism towards the physical
than he is towards the mental. And, finally, the identities that he infers
from principles (1)–(3) do not fit any of our conceptual devices. Davidson
is defenceless against the accusation that such identities are noumenal.
That there cannot be noumenal objects, or events, or characteristics, or
whatever, is the point (d) makes. What are the options left?
The prospect of defending 1, 2 and 3 simultaneously is bleak. If causa-
tion is nomological and there are not psychophysical laws, then (1) is false.
But, even worse, Davidson also argues for an alternative construction of
(1), which could be called Principle of Causal Efficacy of the Mental: (1b)
Reasons are causes, at least of actions. But, there not being psychological
laws either, without token-identities, and given (2) and (3), (1b) would
also be false. I will argue that the only option left in order to save mental
causation and mental/physical interaction is to reject (2), the nomologi-
cal character of causality. Davidson does not offer any argument for this
premise, but rather works as a dogma for him: the fourth and final dogma
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of empiricism, as it has been suggested.9 The consequences of rejecting it
will be explored in Section 6 of this paper.
Let’s briefly consider the alternatives to rejecting (2). One option would
be to reject (3). This could be done either by accepting that there are psy-
chological laws or by also accepting that there are psychophysical laws (to
recognize psychophysical laws without psychological ones would be prone
to the accusation of mixing up realms differently constituted). There would
be nothing recognizably Davidsonian in such options, and it is precisely
against them that his work is directed (the most valuable part of his work, it
could be argued). If we only accept psychological laws, then mental events
would have causal powers, but only within the realm of the mental. That is,
even if one denies the existence of bridge-laws between the physical dis-
course and the mental one, as Davidson does, it is open to claim that there
are psychological laws and hence that reasons can be causes (of actions
but not of physical processes such as, for instance, the water spilled by
my hand wetting the carpet) because there are laws which connect mental
events as cause and effect. There are difficulties with this account. Why do
we need to separate two untranslatable discourses if we do not so obtain a
certain relaxation in one of them that gives room for freedom, for a genuine
notion of action rather than a surrogate? On the other hand, this dualism,
like all kinds of dualism, needs to explain whether both discourses are
about the same world, and if so, how? There is a problem I find more
serious, a problem shared both by the proponent of psychological laws
and by the proponent of psychological and psychophysical laws, and that
is dealing with the difficulty of accounting for the normativity of mental
discourse. If we think of rationalization as a science in the business of
looking for laws, it is unclear how we could still do justice to the idea that
mentality is normative rather than descriptive unless we can show how to
derive norms from scientific laws.
A second option is to give up both (1) and (1b) and to claim that there
is no mental causation (neither mental to mental, nor mental to physical).
Rationality is a matter of understanding, not of causally explaining. This
option, I suspect, is shared by much continental philosophy, and proba-
bly originates in the classic dichotomy between Erklären and Verstehen
that helps to distinguish between Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswis-
senschaften. I feel some sympathy for this tradition; however, I find it
counterintuitive to reject the commonsensical claim that, for instance, the
cause of Othello’s unhappiness is his belief that Desdemona is not faithful
to him, or the cause of Tom’s drinking water rather than wine is his desire
to finish his thesis.10
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6.
In what follows I will explore an alternative account of causality that does
not make the existence of lawlike connections between events necessary
for it. I will propose that the concept of causation can be defined in terms
of explanation, and offer a sketch of the kinds of explanations that could
count as causal. I will briefly consider some counterexamples. This ap-
proach will make it possible to maintain (1b). On the other hand, both (1)
and its converse ((1c) physical events cause mental events) could also be
retained as long as sense can be made of explanations which relate events
described in the vocabulary of the natural sciences and events which in-
volve evaluation.11 I believe that the existence of an intimate link between
our conception of causality and our conception of explanation should be a
Davidsonian thought: I have already argued that the rejection of the third
dogma invites a much deeper interconnection between causal relations and
causal explanations than the one accepted by Davidson.
The idea of causal relations, at least historically, is a latecomer with re-
spect to the ideas of action, responsibility and explanation. I will advocate
for a conception of causation that does not necessarily involve invocation
of laws and I will do so by taking explanation as a prior notion with respect
to causation. I will consider whether loading explanation with such a heavy
burden means giving up what seems a desideratum for something to be a
cause: namely, that it cannot be deduced a priori from its effect. I will
suggest that the reasons invoked in making sense of an action are no more
conceptually derivable from our description of the action than, say, the fact
that the milk-man came this morning is derivable from the milk being at
the door. The conceptual connections in both cases depend on empirical
assumptions and are ultimately subject to empirical testing.
One of the difficulties of trying to grasp Aristotle’s theory of the four
causes, is that the metaphysical load of the modern conception of ‘cause’
precludes it from capturing the richness of the Greek “aitia”. What the four
aitiai have in common for Aristotle is something which our notion of cause
does not capture easily, because the aitia of something is the (sometimes
hidden) explanation of that thing, that which is responsible for that thing
existing. This technical sense was inherited from the work of Hippocrates
(for whom the aitia of a disease was what explained its symptoms) and
Thucydides (who used the word to refer to the factors or persons responsi-
ble for something, e.g., the origin of wars).12 The modern use of the notion
of cause captures one of the kinds of causality contemplated by Aristo-
tle, namely efficient causation. However, even though the teleological and
hylomorphic thinking that sustains the other types of causation may be
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out of fashion, it is still interesting to highlight the priority of explanation
and responsibility with respect to (efficient) cause which follows from the
classic understanding of cause.
I am claiming that the notion of causation is only understandable by
reference to our explanatory practices. This strategy has to deal with a
serious objection: not all explanation is causal explanation. Which kinds
of explanations are suitable to serve as a basis for an understanding of cau-
sation? It can be argued that any correct explanation of an event in terms of
a different and temporarily prior event is a causal explanation. This rules
out “definitional” explanations (such as “I wrote my name because I wrote
‘M’, ‘a’, ‘n’, ‘u’, ‘e’ and ‘l’ ”), explanations which invoke institutions
(“Why did I marry you?”, “Because you said ‘yes’ ”) and deductive expla-
nations (“I like ‘Moondance’ because I like all Van Morrison’s songs”).13
Furthermore, there are two types of causal explanations I am interested in:
rational and nomological explanations. Both are causal inasmuch as they
both relate different events in an explanatory manner. However, rational
explanations are not just causal, but also evaluative, while nomological
explanations, besides being causal, invoke a covering law.14
A more serious problem arises when we want to do justice to the idea
that, for instance, certain chemicals, say psycho active drugs, cause some-
one to have certain beliefs, such as “I am the king of the world”, “Life
is meaningless” or “There is a dragon under my bed”. However, it is not
in contradiction with anything I have said to hold that it makes sense to
say that there must be certain physical or neurological enabling conditions
to have beliefs. One needs a tongue, and probably a heart, to be able to
say “my heart belongs to you”; one needs eyes to see that the Alhambra
is beautiful, etc. However, tongues and eyes and brains are not enough to
make sense of such sayings and seeings, unless we can integrate them in an
account that includes responsiveness to metaphors, to beauty, and to norms
of linguistic correctness.
Something similar can be said with respect to mental to physical cau-
sation. I raise my arm because I want to be polite and say goodbye to
my neighbour. My raising my arm causes wine to spill. The spilt wine
causes certain chemical reactions that stain the carpet. However, if mental
events cannot be identified with physical or chemical events, it seems as if
my desire to be polite has interfered with the causal closure of the realm
of law, given that a mental event, my desire to be polite, has caused a
physical event, a certain chemical reaction. But, unless my saying good-
bye to a neighbour and a certain bodily movement can be identified, it
is hard to see how I can have caused a chemical reaction. It is equally
difficult to swallow that two causal chains are running in parallel; in one
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of them I cause the wine to spoil the carpet, in the other a certain muscular
movement causes a liquid with such and such a chemical composition to
come in contact with a certain fabric. But, this would be a problem for
someone who held that causal chains are independent of the explanatory
frameworks where they belong. In the approach that I have recommended
this is not the case. A nomological relation between events is a relation
that is made sense of within a certain model, one that sees related events
as instantiating a law. In order to do this a great deal of simplification is
needed. Amongst that which is not taken into account is the significance
of the explanandum. However, those “disenchanted” events can be related
to meaningful intentions and activities.
Even though determinism can make sense within certain restricted ar-
eas, universal determinism does not make sense because nomologicality
cannot be understood independently of our explanatory interests, which
seem to involve freedom. A different way of putting the point is saying
that, however important it could be to keep the idea of the causal clo-
sure of physics (i.e., the idea that events described in the vocabulary of
physics cannot be caused from outside the sphere of physically describ-
able events), the causal closure with respect to physics (anything which
happens, however described, is physically caused) does not follow from it.
I have described how we could get around the almost universally ac-
cepted Humean dogma that causality is nomological.15 However, Hume
also introduced another desideratum for a conception of causality:
I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that
the knowledge of this relation [of cause and effect] is not, in any instance, attained by
reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience (. . . ). Let an object be presented to
a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him,
he will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover
any of its causes or effects. (. . . ) [C]auses and effects are discoverable, not by reason but
by experience. (Hume 1748, pp. 27–28)
But is the connection between reasons and actions merely conceptual? To
put it differently: does our description of someone’s bodily movement as
an action or a behaviour involve an a priori connection with the beliefs and
the desires that we use in giving the best explanation of her behaviour?
Think about the following situation: Jerónimo, the milkman of my
town, is bald and wears a red wig. This morning, like all mornings, I
find two bottles of milk at my door, but this time they are covered with
red hairs. This event can be referred to as “milk being at the door” or,
in this occasion, as “two bottles of milk having been left at the door by
Jerónimo, the milkman”, from which we can infer the nature of the cause,
“Jerónimo’s having been here this morning”. However, despite the appar-
ently a priori character of this inference, there are empirical constraints
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which make the inference possible, such as my knowing about Jerónimo’s
baldness and wig, knowing that someone delivers the milk every morning,
etc. And, in fact, I could be wrong, and the cause of milk and hairs being at
the door could be completely unconnected with Jerónimo. My claim is that
an accurate and precise description of the effect is dependent on having a
true (causal) explanation.
Summarizing: the discussion of the nomological or anomalous charac-
ter of causality cannot be made independently of an understanding of our
explanatory practices. Such an understanding must, necessarily, mention
the rational and evaluative character of such practices. Therefore, it is un-
clear whether sense can be made of the claim that our account of mentality
and normativity has to be coherent with laws of nature that are assumed to
be given, i.e., prior and independent to our explanations.
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NOTES
1 Even though Sections 3 and 4 go some way into showing that the idea of such token-
identities is unattractive and problematic, and the proposal argued for in Section 6 can be
of independent interest.
2 Or, maybe, transcendental. Alternatively, it could be defended that Davidson’s argument
leads to a transcendental identity between tokens of mental and physical events, an identity
that is condition of possibility for both the free, and hence anomalous, use of thinking
and for agency to respect the causal closure of reality. This fits nicely with Davidson’s
claim that the three premises of his argument are Kantian, as well as with the idea that
anomalous monism itself is Kant’s position (see Davidson 1970, pp. 207–209). However,
Kant, unlike Davidson, could be allowed to defend anomalous monism as part of his
separation between phenomena and noumena: the nomological character of causality is
a consequence of causality being one the categories of understanding and mental causation
is a prerequisite for practical reason (see note 8 below for more on Kant’s entitlement to
both theses). Davidson, on the other hand, does not have this option because for him there
cannot be an appearance-reality distinction as his argument against the scheme/content
dualism reveals, as I will argue in this paper.
3 Too literal a reading of the expression “in virtue of” can lead to a frequent confusion
in the discussion of Davidson’s argument. It is often claimed that Davidson makes the
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mindedness of mental events merely epiphenomenal: given that there are no psychological
or psychophysical laws, the efficacy of a mental event cannot be ascribed to the mental
properties of the event, as these properties cannot feature in laws. This would only follow
if Davidson’s position were committed to the idea that an event’s causal powers are due to
its properties. Davidson’s nominalism precludes any commitment of the sort from making
sense and, hence, the accusation of epiphenomenalism is misplaced.
4 Davidson denies the existence of psychological and psychophysical laws, but not the
existence of true generalizations with the logical form of a law. However, given that the
nomological character of causality demands strict laws for causality to occur, not merely
true generalization, those generalization are not sufficient to account for causal relations
involving mental events.
5 If events are spatiotemporally located changes, the possession of a belief (explicit or
implicit) could not count as an event. However, the acquisition of a belief (again, explicit
or standing) would.
6 An action is, for Hornsby, a person’s doing something intentionally. See, for instance,
Hornsby 1998, pp. 377–378.
7 I mentioned in Section 2 that true generalizations with the logical form of a law cannot
play the desired role. However, someone may still be tempted to say that mere general-
izations linking mental and physical types could grant enough of a conceptual foothold
to make sense of Davidson’s token-identities. This is not an option open to Davidson: any
statement involving intentional predicates has to be understood in conjunction with the rest
of the intentional framework, making it impossible to pair physical and mental predicates
in an atomistic manner.
8 An admittedly unusual parallel to this line of argument can be found on Hegel’s reaction
to Kant’s commitment to the possibility of pure thought. We find Kant claiming in the
Critique of Judgement: “(. . . ) we can conceive of an intuitive intellect (negatively, that
is, simply as non-discoursive), that would not go from the general to the particular (. . . )
and for which there would be no contingency of the agreement between nature and our
understanding (. . . ) [this agreement] the intuitive intellect does not need [to posit]” (Kant
1790, p. 77). Given that Kant takes the possibility of pure intuition as conceivable, expe-
rience could, in principle (i.e., not for us, but for other kinds of knowers) have a role that
is isolable from the exercise of conceptual capacities (or, more strongly, a role that makes
such capacities completely unnecessary). Hegel, in what I am claiming to be a Davidsonian
move, opposes this line of thought: intuitions without concepts are blind, as Kant forcefully
showed, but they are not blind just for us, but for any thinker deserving the name: “(. . . )
though the categories, such as unity, cause and effect, are strictly the property of thought,
it by no means follows that they must be ours merely and not also the characteristics of the
objects. Kant however confines them to the subject-mind (. . . )” (1802, p. 70). I owe this
note to uncountable discussions with Hilan Bensusan.
9 For instance, McDowell (1985, p. 340) gestures towards an alternative, singularist,
conception of causality about which I will have a bit more to say (see note 15).
10 Authors from a different tradition (see, for instance, Anscombe 1957) reject the idea of
mental causation on similar grounds. However, such a rejection depends on taking causality
to imply laws, and I am trying to show that this is not the only available option (and it
seems to me to go against Wittgenstein’s thought to state something as philosophically
substantive as the idea that any account of causality must appeal to laws). There seems
to be no other reason to reject the idea of mental causation besides embracing premise
(2) of the Davidsonian argument. Once that the option of accounting for (at least some)
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causal connections without needing to invoke laws is recognized, the idea that the mental
is causally inert looses its grip on us.
11 If we consider physical (or chemical or neurophysiological) processes as enabling (but
not constitutive) conditions for rational phenomena, and allow for a conception of the world
which does not identify it with the physical world, our intuition that there is a connection
between the events subject to reasons and events subject to laws can be respected. This will
be especially so for someone who believes that it is not possible to isolate the language
and method of the sciences from the general framework of human knowledge where they
belong. If this is accepted, there is no reason to reject explanations which connect rationally
individuated events with events scientifically described, given that such a connection do not
need to be grounded on laws, after rejecting (2).
12 I am indebted to Manolo León for this philological aside.
13 David Owens’ analysis of causation in Causes and Coincidences offers a highly devel-
oped articulation of the relation between causation and explanation. Causes are defined, in
his account, in terms of coincidences: “A cause ensures that its effects are no coincidence”
(Owens 1992, p. 1), while the central feature of a coincidence is its inexplicability.
14 I am tempted to liken both teleological and historical explanations to rational explana-
tions. Dennett, for instance, has suggested that the idea of evolution by natural selection
is an application of the intentional stance. When we say that “The heart pumps blood
because it is its function” we are appealing to norms in our explanation. Historical expla-
nations, as economic or sociological ones, are rational because they (partially) depend on
psychological ones. But, clearly, all this is very tentative.
15 However, I will say nothing about the possibility of making compatible a “singularist”
or “particularist” conception of causality (which makes it interdependent with explanatory
practices) with the idea that causal relations involve necessity (even if not laws). This can
be done by showing that necessary connections can be found between particulars. See, for
instance, García Encinas, 2003.
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